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Terrorism, Torture And Television:  
“24” in Its Context 
John Downing 
 
The discussion begins with a comparative overview of violence 
against civilians in war, in terroristic actions, and in torture. The 
comparisons are between the USA since the 9/11 attacks, Britain 
during the civil war in Northern Ireland 1969-2000, and France 
during and since the Algerian armed liberation struggle of 1954-
62. The discussion covers the general issues involved, and then 
summarizes existing research on British and French media repre-
sentations of political violence. The article then proceeds to a 
critical-discourse analysis of the US Fox Television channel’s 
highly successful “24” dramatic series. The series has been far 
and away the most extended televisual reflection to date on the 
implications of 9/11. Political violence, counter-terrorism and 
torture are central themes. An argument is made that the series 
constructs a strangely binary imaginary of extremist and moder-
ate “Middle Easterners” while simultaneously projecting a 
weirdly post-racist USA. In particular, the series articulates very 
forcefully an ongoing scenario of instantaneous decision-making, 
under dire impending menace to public safety, which serves to 
insulate U.S. counter-terrorist philosophy and practice from an 
urgently-needed rigorous public critique.  
 
“…one of the immanent possibilities of the state’s monopoly of violence is the 
transgression of those very legal frameworks which in theory act to limit its arbi-
trariness. It is at this point that we talk of states becoming terroristic, or of employ-
ing unacceptable techniques (such as torture) whose use they themselves would 
wish to deny, dissimulate or euphemize.”1 
 
Introduction: violence against civilians, past 
and present 
 
T he main focus of this discussion is the political discourse of the Fox TV series “24” (2001 - ). To grasp its likely input into U.S. culture, however, we need to set it in a much larger comparative and indeed historical (Downing 2007) political and cultural context. 
Sadly, the deliberate infliction of death and mutilation on non-combatants - as 
war policy - is hardly new to human history. David rose greatly in his public’s esti-
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mation when he returned from battle against the Philistines with a liquidation count 
of ten thousand, ten times King Saul’s, and later with two hundred of their severed 
penises, a hundred more than Saul had demanded as bride-price for his daughter (I 
Samuel 18). The Mongol invaders were a byword for the extreme violence they 
meted out to what we would now call civilian populations  (although once they had 
established that they would stop at nothing, their ongoing rule was much less 
harsh). The holy Christian crusaders extended this type of treatment to anyone who 
resisted their looting, Christian or Muslim. At the same time, in the latter centuries 
of European war, perhaps as a result of the comprehensive devastation of the Thirty 
Years War, the tradition grew up in that sphere of the planet that wars were only to 
be fought by soldiers against other soldiers. (Under the rubric of racism, by con-
trast, genocidal campaigns against indigenous Americans or Australians were 
mostly excused or even celebrated.) 
World War II and its precursors – the British onslaught on Kurdish and Arab 
villages in Iraq in 1920,2 the Japanese military invasion of China, the Italian assault 
on Ethiopia, Gernika - put an end to the intra-European code in practice, although 
the old public rhetoric persists to this very day in terminology such as “smart 
bombs” and “minimum collateral damage.” That rhetoric’s continued use pays trib-
ute in some measure to the persistent reluctance of most humans to contemplate the 
savagery of war, for if that were not so, these soothingly hypocritical obfuscations 
would not need to be deployed. In particular, the old soldier-to-soldier battles 
evaporated with the saturation (“carpet”) bombing of Hamburg in July 1943 and 
again in 1944, of Dresden in August 1944, and of some sixty other German cities 
amounting to 20% of the total residential area of the country, killing 300,000 civil-
ians. This was followed by the saturation bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese 
cities in March 1945 (resulting in some 170,000 deaths), which then culminated in 
the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The predominance of the Air Force and of bombing from a safe distance in U.S. 
military strategy dates from that period (Sherry 1987), a strategy which the South 
East Asian War from 1965 to 1975, the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and the Bush 
Administration’s threats against Iran in late 2007, demonstrated to be still para-
mount. A frequently cited study by Sivard (1991) suggests that over the 20th cen-
tury the civilian percentage of wartime deaths rose from 5% in World War I 
through over 50% in World War II, to around 90% by 1990. Thus the gigantic 
15,000-pound “daisy-cutter” bombs deployed in Afghanistan - the total heartless-
ness of this mocking military term is truly evocative of the hypocrisy of America’s 
democratic global mission - had a pristine pedigree. The cluster bombs so beloved 
of the U.S. military high command both multiply immediate civilian casualties and 
scatter the equivalent of landmines and booby-traps that will be set off by casual 
contact later (Wiseman 2003), especially when projected from remote ground-
based missile-launchers. Depleted-uranium bomb casings3 have their own long-
term civilian impact, yet to be fully assessed by independent scientists. 
Yet reduce direct U.S. army casualties by bombing at a distance, and you re-
duce domestic opposition to war, especially since the Vietnam disaster. The high 
proportion of Black and Latino soldiers in the U.S. Army also muffles public reac-
tion to their deaths and mutilation, not in the abstract, but in the sense of their hav-
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ing close social connections to the White majority. The more that opposition gets 
tamped down, the freer across the planet is the hand left to the transnational mili-
tary-industrial complex, with the USA as its principal policeman. 
The rhetoric for public consumption on casualties also sharply varies, depend-
ing on whether it refers to the home team or the away team. Probably many Ameri-
cans know that approximately 2,400 were killed in the Pearl Harbor attack, that 
58,000 U.S. troops were killed in the South East Asian war, and that approximately 
3,000 were killed in the 9/11 attacks. Yet far fewer have an idea even to the nearest 
million of the numbers of Japanese or Vietnamese citizens killed in World War II 
or in the U.S. war in South East Asia, and as a matter of Bush Administration pol-
icy, no numbers are offered, except in individual news stories, of Iraqis4 or Af-
ghanis killed by U.S. forces since 9/11. If the figures of Iraqi, Vietnamese, Korean 
or Japanese civilian deaths had been as consistently rehearsed in U.S. news media 
as the losses suffered by Americans, this ignorance would arguably have been a 
great deal less. When, in a 1995 Smithsonian Institute exhibit on the nuclear attacks 
on Japan this silence looked like it was being ruptured, even that momentary breach 
was ferociously sutured over - a full fifty years afterwards.5 
On occasions when silence does break, when it is impossible any longer to deny 
the scale of annihilation achieved or torture practiced, then the default – and pas-
sionate! – response has generally been to claim that what was done was the lesser 
of two evils. Bombed Vietnamese hamlets were better than Communist ones, a 
flattened Hiroshima and Nagasaki were better than pursuing a long-drawn-out war, 
and unless the USA wished to be seen as a permanent soft target, a vast crowd of 
Arabs and assorted Muslims definitely had to be seen to have helped to pay for 
9/11 with their own lives – predominantly their children’s lives, in practice. This 
defense would be much more ethically credible if it did not usually have to wait to 
be dragged out in answer to the evidence of huge slaughter, if it were for example 
routinely accompanied by a forthright acknowledgment of the monumental levels 
of suffering entailed on the other side. “Shock and awe” in Baghdad was not a fire-
work display, as US media exultantly portrayed it. It communicated what the U.S. 
military is prepared to do to civilians. 
 
 
Civilian War Casualties vs.  
Terrorism Casualties 
 
Yet after 9/11, “terrorism” – meaning non-state violence against civilians - has be-
come The Pre-Eminent Evil (this capitalization is not meant to imply endorsing it). 
It has also become the default rationale around the world among regimes glad to 
find a U.S.-supported justification for their own repression of civilians (Russian 
forces in Chechnya, for example). “Terrorism’s” conspicuous utility lies in its open
-endedness: no state can be negotiated with to end this war, no one can finally as-
sert with total confidence that there are no terrorists left, and consequently it is mar-
velously pliable, an infinite resource from which to rationalize not only war, but 
extensive political surveillance, the abrogation of citizens’ legal protections, secret 
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trials, and politicized violence: torture, subhuman jail conditions, assassination 
squads. Piece by piece, perhaps, not all at once on U.S. soil. 
Yet in the longer term, as Danner (2004) has forthrightly argued, neither Abu 
Ghraib, nor Guantánamo, nor the Pakistani or Egyptian jails to which the U.S. gov-
ernment transported terrorism suspects to be tortured in its “extraordinary rendi-
tion” programs, need be external to the USA, even though in this transitional period 
their location was precisely selected so as to be beyond the jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts and protections.6 If this logic of “anti-terrorism becomes hegemonic and is 
endorsed by U.S. courts and major media, there will be seen to be no long-term 
reason to “keep the gloves on” or defend the general public’s civil liberties inside 
the USA.7 (The well-placed will no doubt stay well-placed.) 
Thus non-state terrorist attacks on civilians, as opposed to state-sponsored mili-
tary attacks on civilians, have become quite successfully defined as the ultimate 
public horror which justifies new forms of state repression and violence (against 
civilians). The fascist-influenced military government of Argentina in the period 
1976-83, covertly supported by the U.S. administration in 1976, similarly justified 
its systematic arbitrary arrests, torture, and physical disappearance of some 30,000 
citizens, mostly labor union leaders, teachers, and psychiatrists, in the name of a 
war against terrorism, although the statistics clearly demonstrate that deaths and 
injuries from leftist guerrilla attacks in the years immediately preceding the junta’s 
coup d’état were puny in number by comparison. This policy was akin to the CIA’s 
Phoenix Program implemented in southern Vietnam a little earlier, in 1967 
(Valentine 2000), which targeted the civilian infrastructure of the National Libera-
tion Front. In the process it eliminated some 40,000 Vietnamese, systematically 
using torture as well as assassination.8  
In the USA in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the very muted public debate 
about interrogation tactics in Afghanistan and Guantánamo, voices were raised ar-
guing that in times of crisis civil protections might have to be put on hold. Promi-
nent among these was Allan Dershowitz, the energetically self-publicizing Harvard 
University law professor and trial lawyer. His argument was, following the publica-
tion of the Aussaresses memoir (see below), that the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution might be protected if specific warrants to torture were issued in cases 
of extreme threat. Mr Dershowitz’ thirst for the public spotlight was one thing, but 
his injection of this logic into public debate certainly did nothing to protect the pris-
oners in Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, who overwhelmingly had only 
their own blood on their hands, put there by their captors. In a public many of 
whose members were complaisant with revenge, any revenge, his intervention gave 
extra fuel to the Bush Administration’s claim that it was resolutely attacking the 
roots of terrorism. 
In a moment we will revisit the logic of this anti-terrorism strategy through a 
discussion of Chomsky and Herman’s construct of “wholesale” and “retail” terror-
ism, but first let us review how the U.S. government’s “anti-terrorist” repression 
strategy has had companions-in-arms over the years, both Britain (unsurprisingly) 
and France (notwithstanding the frenzied brouhaha over the inter-imperial dissen-
sion about the Iraq War). Subsequently, we will compare media coverage of terror-
ism between these three nations. 
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Northern Ireland and Algeria: the USA is not an isolate 
 
The story is definitely not just an American one (not that any cause for celebration 
or relief are to be inferred). We need to recognize how the British regime in North-
ern Ireland since 1969 and the French regime in Algeria in the period 1954-62 – 
and since – mirror many of the trends just summarized. 
In 2001, retired French general Paul Aussaresses (2001) published a book not 
only acknowledging that he and the French army had organized the systematic tor-
ture of Algerians during the 1954-62 insurgency, but also vigorously defending the 
practice. He further insisted that top government ministers at the time, such as So-
cialist Party leaders Guy Mollet and Interior Minister François Mitterrand 
(subsequently two-term president), had been fully au fait with this; a claim of 
which we need not feel compelled to be skeptical. 
The news was hardly news to those Algerians whose family members had been 
subjected to torture or murdered, or among relatives of the million or more Alge-
rian villagers forcibly herded en masse into concentration camps.9 Or to the politi-
cally informed, left or right, in France. Nonetheless, the defiant acknowledgment of 
torture by a general himself involved in it, and the subsequent letter of support 
signed by some five hundred past and present French generals, was a classic case of 
insistent justification of merciless brutality the French establishment had long and 
systematically denied, despite attempts by French and Algerian individuals and 
organizations, from the first years of the independence war, to get it acknowledged 
and stopped. That story is not only a fifty-year-old one: the violent repression that 
plagued Algeria since 1992 represented, very plausibly, a continuation in new cir-
cumstances of the Franco-Algerian political economy of terror.10 Furthermore, Le 
Pen (leader of the neo-fascist Front National), who had been a paratrooper in Alge-
ria, publicly defended his activities as a torturer during that war. The Franco-
Algerian past and present were intimately conjoined. 
The Northern Ireland scenario from 1969 onwards held both parallels and con-
trasts with the foregoing.11 The numbers killed were far fewer than in Iraq or Alge-
ria, and the patterns of repression and terrorization of populations, whilst evident, 
were seemingly more restrained. McGuffin (1974) produced the first account of the 
British army’s interrogation methods (hooding, standing for very long periods of 
time spread-eagled, subjection to continuous white noise or loud noise, sleep depri-
vation, beatings, kickings). In a 1978 ruling, the European Court of Human Rights 
officially declared these practices not to be torture, but nonetheless to be inhuman, 
degrading and contrary to European Union human rights standards. 
There was in addition to these practices, however, a sinister program of targeted 
assassinations, often organized via the British government’s Force Research Unit or 
the heavily Loyalist northern Ireland police hierarchy passing the names of alleged 
Republican terrorists to Loyalist paramilitaries, who would be the ones to do the 
actual killing. Some one hundred fifty individuals may have been disposed of in 
this way (Murray 2003). The most notorious case of direct British government exe-
cutions was the 1988 street liquidation in Gibraltar of three unarmed terrorist sus-
pects by a British government counter-terrorist unit. The overall “shoot-to-kill” 
policy was long vigorously denied by the government, with one senior police chief 
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investigating the case forced into early retirement and with another having his of-
fice torched to destroy his documentation. Finally in 2003 the Force Research Unit 
was officially declared to have been a “rogue” unit (Bamber & Palmer 2003). This 
is, needless to say, fully credible… 
Rather obviously, neither in Algeria, Northern Ireland or the “Middle East” was 
there a unilateral initiative on the part of the French, British or American states. 
There was an armed insurrection against French colonial rule, designed to bring it 
to an end, there was a similar insurgency12 designed to close out British rule in 
northern Ireland (a majority of deaths were caused by that insurgency13), and the 
murderous 9/11 attacks did happen. In every case, therefore, the insurgents too gen-
erated civilian casualties and routinely defined them as the necessary costs of war. 
The struggle was never a fictional one. In both Algeria, however, and much later in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the devastation within the camp of the poor and dispossessed 
was out of all proportion to the death-toll for the French and the Americans: ten 
times higher (one million) for Algerians, and in Iraq at the time of writing in 2007, 
±200 times higher than 9/11.14 
Not that the Iraqis had created 9/11. Nor that the U.S. military were the direct 
agents of this huge carnage in its entirety. But even within the fake rationales of the 
Bush Administration for its inroads into Afghanistan and Iraq, the sustained sav-
agery of the reprisals was out of all proportion to the devastations of 9/11, and the 
indescribable planners of the invasion itself were direct agents of the ensuing civil 
war. 
All in all, then, there is a comparable pattern of state behavior across these three 
nations, involving both torture as a matter of policy, and savagely disproportionate 
mass retaliation for non-state political violence.  
 
“Democratic” violence: torturing ethical principles 
 
A major issue, however, is how these democratic regimes responded to these situa-
tions. Specifically, how they used force. And under the heading of force, the extent 
to which they bypassed their own laws and their ringing proclamations of democ-
ratic principle and of being global moral leaders, to inflict preventive detention, 
torture and pre-emptive assassination against real insurgents - or simply against 
random members of the public categorized as potential insurgents as a result of 
‘racial’ profiling, by the extension of the label “terrorist”15 to peaceful opposition-
ists, and by the ever-escalating dynamic of political surveillance. In other words, 
the extent to which they themselves used terror – bodily duress as a communication 
tool - and its ancillaries. 
This question inevitably leads us to evaluate the argument by Chomsky and 
Herman (1979: 85-99) that terrorism comes in two forms, state or “wholesale” vio-
lence, and insurgent or “retail” violence. Their position is unequivocal, that during 
the Cold War era major Western states, the USA in the lead, perpetrated far more 
numerous and wholesale acts of terroristic violence than did insurrectionary guerril-
las and terrorists, yet in those states’ official and media discourse the designation 
“terrorist” was entirely reserved for the retail merchants of destruction. The states, 
in this rhetoric, were acting only, and legitimately, to protect or extend national 
6
Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 21 [2021], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol21/iss2/4
security, order and democracy. Chomsky and Herman point by way of refutation to 
the Indonesian bloodbath of 1966, the Indochina War through 1975, and (in their 
later writings) Latin America and the Middle East, for proof positive that these ra-
tionales were and are a grotesque fiction, an up-ending of the truth. 
Schlesinger (1991), despite sharp differences at a series of points with Chomsky 
and Herman’s analyses, sets out to establish fundamentals in his essay cited at the 
outset, and cites Max Weber, in turn citing Leon Trotsky, that a defining character-
istic of the modern state is its claim to a legitimate monopoly on the means of vio-
lence. This is not the only facet of the modern state, but arguably it is its bedrock 
dimension. Thus in the discussion of terrorism, the question shifts from its social-
ethical to its political-ethical dimension. The argument becomes a pragmatic one 
about who is politically enabled to be violent, not the absolutist Gandhian or Tol-
stoian question of whether anyone is so entitled. 
The Chomsky and Herman argument is hard to dismiss in the face of histori-
cally grounded statistics of death and destruction. The Israeli-Palestinian statistics 
of the second Intifada that has dominated world news since 2000, with a ratio of 
three Palestinians killed for every one Israeli, are actually, notwithstanding their 
tragic consequences, and without a shred of intent to minimize them, less asymmet-
rical than many such “wholesale-retail” scenarios. The point is not to blot out those 
horrors for Palestinians and Israelis or soften them, but to mark the even more terri-
fying savagery that has marked the state’s supposedly legitimate use of violence 
against those within the realm it has defined as its own domain (which, for the U.S. 
regime since Jefferson, has repeatedly meant anywhere it chose in the planet). 
Unless we are to subscribe to a Hobbesian statolatry, or a kneejerk “America-the-
beautiful,” we cannot avert our gaze from this.  
Schlesinger’s argument does not move into this terrain, but simply seeks to 
complicate the nature of political violence, avoiding the heavily freighted associa-
tions of the term “terrorism.” But does his, or Chomsky and Herman’s position, 
imply we should regard “retail” political violence – non-state terrorism - as some-
how acceptable? In my judgment, only those predisposed to smear any or all of 
these writers could reasonably answer in the affirmative. On the other hand, as with 
Herman and Chomsky’s rhetorical “jiu-jitsu” with the term “propaganda” (Herman 
& Chomsky 1988), their redefinition of non-state terrorism as “retail” risks down-
playing it, not so much ethically as politically. In addition, its capacity to be recu-
perated as a justification for intensifying the state’s repressive armory and expand-
ing its targets, is a very dangerous dimension to neglect. 
There is therefore a triangular issue: (1) the state’s privileged and self-
legitimated access to the means of violence, at home and abroad, and how it uses 
them against civilians - particularly how the U.S. regime does so at this point in 
history; (2) the political violence of non-state agents; and (3) the uses of terror and 
torture by the state against presumed or real agents in the second category. We now 
turn to studies of media coverage of these processes. 
 
Media Coverage of Political Violence: Britain and 
France 
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It is impossible to do more than indicate the main lines of research to date, without 
any pretence that the research literature itself is comprehensive in scope. One of the 
best studies is by Schlesinger, Murdock and Elliott (1983), which seeks to compare, 
contrast and relate television news and entertainment formats’ representations of 
terrorism. They note that in the British case there was a time-lag quite often be-
tween news coverage and fictional coverage, but that fictional coverage frequently 
drew upon stories of some months beforehand to lend itself a sense of immediacy, 
and in so doing often translated the news frame into a dramatic genre. “24” repre-
sents an extended illustration of this process. 
Most other studies focus just on terrorism and news. Fleury-Villatte (2000) and 
De Bussière and her colleagues (1999) register, for different periods, passing in-
stances of fictional entertainment, but their emphasis is fundamentally on news, 
news magazines and documentaries - although Hennebelle et al. (1997) focus on 
cinematic portrayals. Elsewhere Schlesinger (1987: 205-43) investigates in some 
detail the often tense relationship between the TV news channels and the British 
government over coverage of Northern Ireland in the period up to 1986, concentrat-
ing on the mostly successful tactics used by successive administrations to intimi-
date untrammeled reporting of the crisis. 
Taken together, the studies by De Bussière and her colleagues, and Fleury-
Villatte, covering respectively 1954-62 and 1962-1992, come closest to a connected 
narrative evaluating a variety of media, but always with a predominant concentra-
tion on news and journalism. This tends to lead to a restricted focus just on “what 
was left out,” including torture, but also the political violence experienced by the 
pieds-noirs, the harkis16 and anti-war demonstrators.17 The power of dramatic rep-
resentation is relegated to the margins of concern,  
At the same time, the Fleury-Villatte study uncovers the fascinating extent to 
which masses of film footage rejected out of hand at the time by news editors had 
nonetheless been shot and subsequently archived, reflecting the division of labor 
and very often of viewpoints between journalists in the field and their safely en-
sconced superiors. Fleury-Villatte includes as an appendix a lengthy interview with 
Pierre Abramovici, producer of a documentary on the fascistic Secret Armed Or-
ganization (Organisation Armée Secrète, OAS) that set off a terrifying series of anti
-civilian bombs and assassinations in 1961-62, in the hope of compelling Algeria to 
be retained as French. His account of the material he uncovered in the process, that 
gave the lie to continuing regime propaganda, is illuminating.  
British media coverage of Northern Ireland I will summarize much more 
briefly.18 For some forty-five years following the initial foundation of the Protestant
-dominated state-ling/“province” in 1920, British media pursued a policy of news 
neglect, malign or otherwise. For most intents and purposes, the Six Counties sepa-
rated from the rest of Ireland were not on the British media radar. With the rise of 
the U.S. civil rights movement, and a corresponding student-led movement in 
Northern Ireland in 1967-69, British media briefly swung into focus and even lent a 
strong measure of support for the students. But with the resurgence of an armed 
separatist nationalist movement from 1969 onwards, British broadcast media in-
creasingly operated within the general parameters of government policy. 
When they did not, all hell broke loose at government level. It was short of di-
8
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rect soviet-type controls, but nonetheless sufficient to dissuade all but the most 
trenchant of journalists and editors from addressing Northern Ireland issues in 
depth and with honesty (Schlesinger 1987: xvi-xxi, 205-43; see also Curtis 1984). 
Even so there was a period early in the Troubles during which contradictory 
tendencies expressed themselves. Bloody Sunday 1971, when British troops opened 
fire on a peaceful and unarmed Catholic demonstration in Derry, the second city of 
northern Ireland, killing some thirteen and wounding others, was telecast that Sun-
day in considerable detail, as had been the violent attack on an unarmed march 
some eighteen months before. The British state immediately whitewashed the mur-
derous attack, only recanting its subterfuges some thirty years later. Yet the visual 
image of the dead and wounded at the rally was not one which would smoothly 
dissipate. 
To summarize: there is no single continuing study of all facets of media repre-
sentation of political violence in either nation. Nonetheless the state’s attempts to 
shape and censor terrorism news coverage are self-evident. Equally evident are 
sustained attempts by some media professionals to function independently of the 
state’s dictates and pressures. The case of “24”, however, represented a very sus-
tained fictional echo of news coverage of Bush Administration policies to combat 
terrorism, and a dramatic endorsement of them. It offered only the rarest signs of 
dissent, portraying resistance in the Cabinet to a declaration of martial law (Series 
5), or to setting up Arab-American internment camps (Series 6). It illustrated well 
what Andersen (2006) refers to as “militainment,” the interpenetration of the mili-
tary and entertainment establishments, which in an era of mostly sagging journalis-
tic standards may come to figure as the U.S. public’s chief form of access to current 
events. 
 
“24” as a case-study in media representation of 
“terrorism” 
 
Originally put into development in 2000, and first heralded in the trade press in 
spring 2001, “24” was evidently not sparked by 9/11, although those events and 
their aftermath clearly influenced the script’s formation at points thereafter – and, 
inevitably, the U.S. and global television audiences’ appropriations of the series. 
The series was launched in November 2001, was in due course successfully nomi-
nated for numerous Emmy’s and Golden Globes, and sold very widely around the 
world.19 The first series was rebroadcast entire over a holiday weekend, and DVD 
versions of each series were soon on the market. At the time of writing, its sixth 
season had concluded, and its seventh and eighth were contracted. Thus, while not 
the sole U.S. cultural representation of terrorism (and other issues), it was certainly 
a very sustained and popular one for its domestic and global audiences. Its domestic 
audience routinely numbered 10-13 million viewers. It was in many ways an illus-
tration of Andersen’s (2006: 243-257) thesis of the rise of “militainment.” 
Stylistically, it broke some new ground in purporting to operate in real time, 
each episode of the serial supposedly consisting of successive one-hour periods in a 
single 24-hour day. In fact, aside from the first episode of the second series which 
9
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was run without commercials as a loss-leader, it lent itself to easy gibes from the 
Left, in that the real running time minus ads was closer to 42 minutes than 60. Even 
nuclear crises, it seemed, would respectfully wait for commercials to air before 
daring to proceed further. In addition to this, the series writers and producers were 
committed to the “surprise twist,” which meant that each episode worked very hard 
to generate a mass of unexpected cliff-hangers. 
The fact that there were always at least three simultaneous plots running kept 
this momentum busy for the most part: (1) terrorist attacks on a presidential candi-
date, then president (Series 1-3), then assassinated by order of his successor 
(beginning of Series 5); (2) terrorist attacks on the intimate associates of the chief 
counter-terrorism operative, the series hero; and (3) convoluted machinations inside 
the various presidents’ own teams and the counter-terrorism organization, both of 
them penetrated to various degrees by “the bad guys” (though neither we nor “the 
good guys” know initially whom to trust). The few individuals in whom, pretty 
well, the audience was invited to place its unquestioning trust were David Palmer 
the presidential candidate/president/ex-president, his brother Wayne (president in 
Series 6), the chief counter-terrorism operative Jack Bauer, his girl friend in Series 
4-6, and a very small scatter of lesser government and counter-terrorism officials. 
Even these latter, though never suborned, were wont to be distracted from counter-
terrorism by purely personal and emotional dramas. 
Series 1 mostly revolved around the frantic, fraught attempts of Jack Bauer 
(Kiefer Sutherland) to protect from terrorist attacks and kidnappers both David 
Palmer, the presidential candidate (Dennis Haysbert), and his own wife and late 
teenage daughter. The terrorists seized Bauer’s wife and late teen daughter as hos-
tages to neutralize Bauer’s consummate protection skills for the president. Series 2 
revolved around a threat to detonate a nuclear device in Los Angeles, and a plot to 
unseat David Palmer, now president, from office. Bauer’s daughter found herself 
once more simultaneously in a series of calamities which constantly threatened to 
distract Bauer from his prime task, but he manfully continued to juggle both re-
sponsibilities successfully, a model to us all of how to combine serious parenting 
with counter-terrorist dedication. Parallel with Bauer’s family trials went the vivid 
tensions in the president’s own family, centered principally around his ruthless and 
power-obsessed wife, Sherry Palmer, a Lady MacBeth/Hillary Clinton character 
played to the hilt by Penny Johnson Jerald. 
Series 3 had Jack Bauer struggling to defeat a conspiracy to unleash a weapon-
ized virus, which initially appeared to involve Mexican drug cartel barons, but was 
actually led by a disillusioned British ex-operative, Stephen Saunders. In Series 4, 
Bauer combatted terrorists led by a certain Marwan Habib, who were trying to 
cause nuclear power plant meltdowns all over the USA, and succeeded in one case. 
They shot down Air Force One, very seriously wounding the U.S. president on 
board, and finally launched a nuclear missile at Los Angeles. In the course of these 
events, Bauer was involved in a firefight inside the Chinese Embassy in Washing-
ton DC in which a senior Chinese official accidentally got shot dead by his own 
embassy guards. They blamed Bauer. 
Series 5 saw Bauer once again trying to stop terrorist nerve gas attacks (two 
actually take place, one in a shopping mall, the other in a hospital). It eventually 
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emerges that the plot originated with the new U.S. president, and that Bauer’s own 
brother, not previously seen in the series, was master-minding the operation, intent 
on protecting US oil interests in Central Asia. At the series end, the plot defeated, a 
Chinese commando squad seized Jack in retaliation for his role in the embassy at-
tack (Series 4) and to extract information from him.  
In Series 6, bearded, exhausted and virtually speechless after 20 months of un-
successful Chinese interrogation, he had just been released in order to deal with 
terrorists led by a certain Abu Fayed, but manipulated by an ultra-nationalist Rus-
sian general. As the series commenced, these charmers had been setting off bombs 
in U.S. cities for eleven whole weeks, with 900 fatalities. They also had possession 
of five ‘suitcase’ nuclear bombs and detonated one 20 miles north of Los Angeles. 
They eventually were disposed of, but the Chinese and Russian governments were 
far from being out of the picture, since Chinese operatives had accessed a crucial 
circuit board from one of the ‘suitcase’ bombs, which could give them access to 
Russian defense codes, and the Russian government threatened a military attack 
unless it was restored to them. 
The series’ links, like the overall links of News Corp.’s Fox television channel, 
were very close indeed to the Bush White House, and to the Bush Administration’s 
vitriolically Rightist media spokespeople such as radio and television commentator 
Rush Limbaugh. On June 23rd, 2006, a Heritage Foundation press conference cele-
brated the series, with lead speakers being Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Home-
land Security, and Limbaugh, who took pains to announce that Vice-President Che-
ney and then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld were “huge” fans. Both speakers 
lavishly praised the show. One of its two producers, Robert Cochran was present to 
adorn the occasion. Its executive producer, Joel Surnow, was profiled in The New 
Yorker (Mayer 2007).  A close friend of Limbaugh’s, Surnow is an energetic and 
very well-placed media activist for the political Right, who “would like to counter 
the prevailing image of Senator Joseph McCarthy as a demagogue and a 
liar” (Mayer: 80). 
The three related facets of “24” that I shall examine are its representations of 
ethnicity; of the “soul” of terrorism; and of torture. 
Ethnicity. Ethnicity’s relevance in the series’ narrative to broader social narra-
tives – quite often leaching into religion when the series features characters from 
the ‘Middle East’ – lies in the political categorization of citizens in periods of real 
or declared national security crises. In one way or another, this crisis-categorization 
process has exceptionally deep roots in U.S. historical culture (Downing 2007). 
‘Racial’ profiling since 9/11 officially focused on people of a supposedly ‘Middle 
Eastern’ appearance, although in practice in the USA, Britain and France the prime 
targets for special searches and stop and search procedures were people of color in 
general (along with a little dusting of White nursing mothers and seniors in wheel-
chairs to provide a facade of impartiality).  
Thus the situation proved ambivalent, with traditionally salient racist categories, 
defining African Americans, Latinos, Pacific Asians as both inferior and threaten-
ing, jostling for position within the USA with newer ones marking out Arabs, 
‘Middle Easterners’, and Muslims as the new prime enemy. These Orientalist 
frames had been injected with new life during the 1980-81 US Embassy hostage 
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episode in Teheran, and kept on the simmer through 9/11 and since by routinely 
anti-Palestinian coverage of the Israeli occupation. In the USA the ideological 
premise was that in the face of terrorism, and with the claimed total success of the 
Black civil rights movement, the nation stood united and cohesive, immune to its 
traditional divisions. “24” articulated this premise incessantly.  
In “24” Arabs, ‘Middle Easterners’ and Muslims, the contemporary USA’s 
prime Other, were systematically binarized into the virtuous and the hideous. Not 
unlike the “good Indian”/“vicious Indian” binary in the Hollywood Western. For 
example an imam of one U.S. mosque was shown to be fully cooperative and to 
find terrorism totally repugnant (Series 2). In the same series another Arab, initially 
entirely distrusted by Bauer and his associates, ends up seriously injured by terror-
ists, and then killed by street thugs precisely because he is a ‘Middle Easterner.’ 
And this, despite the fact that if only they were not so stupid, thuggish and blinded 
by their prejudices, he is the one person at that point who has the necessary infor-
mation to stop the nuclear device from being detonated which will inexorably affect 
them too. In Series 6, the Number 2 in command at the counter-terrorism office is 
an Arab American woman; and a Muslim rights organization leader is ready to be 
wrongly incarcerated in order to glean information from suspected terrorists in the 
same detention center, telling his civil rights lawyer girlfriend “Stop being a lawyer 
for one damned minute!” 
Another Series 2 character, not defined explicitly as Iranian, but with the first 
name Reza, is scripted initially to appear suspicious, and the potentially sinister 
fiancé of a naïve White American girl, who does not appear to have a clue what she 
is getting into. The ultimate plot twist, however, is that she herself is the trained and 
merciless terrorist who hesitates only a brief second before shooting dead, on her 
wedding day, both her fiancé and a Black FBI agent. We shall come back to her, 
but her fiancé turns out to be a tragic and good-hearted victim, not in the least sinis-
ter after all. The script here deliberately played with, and against, common expecta-
tions in the U.S. public. Yet in Series 6, a well-meaning but tragically naïve White 
family rushes to protect their neighbor’s teen son Ahmed from another neighbor’s 
retaliation for the bomb outrages, only shortly afterwards to find him threatening to 
kill them if they do not help him deliver a nuclear switch to the terrorists.  
Thus in many cases the villains are indeed Arabs (lead villains  include Syed 
Ali in Series 2, Habib Marwan in Series 4, Abu Fayed in Series 6), or Iranians 
(Navi Araz in Series 4), though never explicitly distinguished from Arabs except 
for those who know Persian names. Thus the TV series reproduces a conventional 
news media bifurcation of “extremist” vs. “moderate” Muslim/Arab, a splendidly 
flattening rhetorical exercise pretending to diversity (does not the very adjective 
“moderate” imply that it would really be preferable, cleaner, not to be a Muslim at 
all?).  
In Series 1, the primary terrorists are Serbs, not Arabs, obviously echoing the 
systematic demonization of all Serbs that took place during the monumental civil 
strife in former Yugoslavia in the years leading up to the development of this 
drama. They are seeking revenge on the presidential candidate and on Jack Bauer, 
because Bauer had been the lead hitman in an undercover targeted assassination of 
a Serb terrorist, greenlighted by presidential candidate Palmer when he had been 
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Senate Intelligence Committee chair. The hit, it emerged, had liquidated several of 
the terrorist’s family members, but not him or his younger brother. However, as the 
saga continues, it also emerges that – as with some other terrorist activist groups we 
see in action during the series – they in turn are being manipulated behind the 
scenes by individuals who will use them to achieve their fell ends, but will equally 
discard them without a backward glance. Thus all the Serb terrorists are eventually 
killed at the close of Series I, but it is made explicit that there are still more deadly 
– and domestic American! – forces at work, whose agenda to dispose of President 
Palmer remains to be activated. In Series 5, a leading terrorist is heavily implied to 
be a Chechen, Vladimir Bierko (unaccountably sporting a British accent).  
The series sometimes suggests that Arabs and Muslims are liable to be used as a 
smokescreen by people with genuinely terroristic designs. In Series 6, the Arab 
terrorists are being manipulated by an ultra-nationalist Russian general who de-
spises them and ‘the West’ equally and hopes to get both ‘sides’ to destroy each 
other. Indeed, some of the most dangerous and ruthless people in the series are not 
only White (Saunders in Series 3, Henderson in Series 5), but also include ranking 
members of the Los Angeles counter-terrorism unit, and of successive presidents’ 
cabinets, including the president himself in Series 5 (who looks and sounds re-
markably like Richard Nixon).  
There is no reference at any point to White racism: even at moments of the 
highest tension, people disagree with each other, scream at each other, plan to dis-
pose of each other, but with never the whisker of a racist slur or attitude. The urban 
street-scum in the earlier phase of the series who intermittently erupted into the 
action to complicate it further, were all White. There are two Black U.S. presidents, 
yet not even their direst foes trouble to allude to their blackness. The Black Chief of 
Staff of the counter-terrorism unit, prominent in Series 4 and 5, is a paragon of 
dedication, so much so that when Bauer is forced to shoot him in Series 6, he per-
mits himself the rare emotional self-indulgence of vomiting. The only dangerous 
and ruthless Black character is the first President Palmer’s wife, but no one makes 
derogatory reference to her Blackness. This clearly posits a “post-racist” scenario, 
where White racism has vanished.  
Overall, the series draws upon current national stereotypes aplenty, especially 
those enshrined in ongoing news media stories – Mexican drug barons, Serb terror-
ists, Chechen and Russian terrorists, Chinese secret agents, as well as Arab and 
Iranian terrorists. It produces an absurdly binarized definition of U.S. inhabitants of 
‘Middle Eastern’ origin. And it projects a fantastic, denialist remove from the ongo-
ing realities of contemporary U.S. racism. There is plenty in “24” to help inculcate 
and intensify fear in the U.S. public. There is zero to acknowledge the reality of 
‘racial’ profiling on the multiple levels it is practiced, or to block the de-
humanization of ‘Middle Easterners’ into stick-figures labeled OK or vicious.  
The “soul” of terrorism. There are terrorists aplenty in these series, and they 
include some of “us,” not least the character of Nina, with whom at the beginning 
of Series 1, Jack Bauer has just concluded an affair, but who is still his chief assis-
tant. Apparently 120% loyal to him and to his desperate attempts to protect his es-
tranged wife and daughter, she then turns out at the close of Series 1 to have been 
scheming throughout to have the presidential candidate assassinated – but not for 
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the Serbian terrorists. Sherry Palmer, the President’s wife, is in cahoots with a high-
level group threatening to detonate the nuclear device in Los Angeles. In Series 5, 
even the U.S. president is organizing a terroristic conspiracy, albeit with the goal of 
securing Central Asian oil reserves to sustain the U.S. economy. Terrorists-Я-Us! 
This complicates “24” a little as regards stock tropes of Muslims, Arabs and 
“Middle Easterners,” and that is in its favor. Women, too, have equal opportunity to 
be terrorists with men, though in terms of some patriarchal tropes, that makes the 
situation more than doubly dangerous and especially evil.  
At the same time, the representation of one terrorist in Series 2 has a particular 
fascination. She is Marie Warner, younger sister of Kate Warner and fiancée of the 
initially suspicious-looking Reza. Both sisters’ father does contract research work 
for the CIA. Both sisters speak Arabic, Marie seemingly well, Kate more haltingly. 
Whereas the Serb terrorists in Series 1 had an explicit and comprehensible agenda, 
to avenge the accidental slaughter of their family by Bauer’s assassination squad on 
then-Senator Palmer’s orders, Marie Warner was different. She had seemingly im-
bibed a jihadist netherworld perfectly clear to her, but utterly opaque to reasoning 
or feeling humans. Prepared virtually without emotion to kill her fiancé on their 
wedding day, to see her father jailed and interrogated on suspicion of bankrolling 
terrorists, and even to threaten to shoot her own sister (whom we have seen stand-
ing by her through thick and thin), her character becomes entirely enigmatic. All 
the more so because of her entirely credible spoiled and narcissistic character-
acting in the earlier part of Series 2, where political logic plays no apparent role 
whatsoever in her demeanor.  
She is, not least, prepared to see the nuclear device detonated in Los Angeles 
because ultimately the devastation will serve many more people than those killed, 
maimed and bereaved, as she explains to her incredulous sister at a climactic mo-
ment. The conversation is the closest “24” takes us to understanding what makes 
the traitor-terrorist tick. She tells her sister their father works for the CIA. “So 
what?” replies her sister. “So what? Do you have any idea of what suffering they 
cause around the world?” retorts Marie. “[But]…you don’t want all those innocent 
people to die?” Kate says to her disbelievingly, and as Marie responds by threaten-
ing to shoot her, Kate doesn’t believe she will carry through. Marie: “I will. Be-
cause this is more important than your life. Or my life.” And when herself shot a 
moment later in the shoulder by Bauer, and subsequently interrogated by him, she 
snarls “Nobody is innocent in this country!”  
In the final episode of Series 2 we see her chained in a perspex holding cage, 
with her father desperately trying to communicate with her through the perspex, to 
hear from her some explanation that can comfort him. She is entirely silent, almost 
autistic-seeming, bathed in bright light that makes her bleached hair wispy and ren-
ders her eyes in shadow and hence entirely opaque. Her whitened face is expression
-less, a frozen mask, sharply contrasting with the grieved, shocked and horrified 
faces of her father and sister. The background music is quiet but eerie, a kind of 
aural representation of a strange and deeply terrifying alienation psychosis. Marie 
calls Kate back for a moment as she and her father are leaving, a brief little smile of 
vicious triumph crosses her face, and she says to Kate: “You think you’ll be safe 
out there? You won’t be.”  
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This scene is visually and aurally definitive. The domestically-reared terrorist is 
framed in ways quite similar to the depiction of American communists in McCarthy 
era Hollywood movies: completely devoid of human emotion, family warmth or 
estimable values, and prepared to sacrifice many millions for their horrific cause. 
These scenes and their accompanying dialogue pinpoint Marie as the ultimate alien, 
resonating with Osama bin Laden’s ideology of collective guilt, yet as “white-
bread” as they come. This scenario connects to Bauer’s and President Palmer’s 
terroristic torture actions (see below), justified in the interests of saving multiple 
lives, but in “24’s” narrative these servants of the State are the retail terrorists, and 
Marie is the wholesale terrorist.  
Terrorists and thugs who capture Bauer and members of his family are shown to 
be totally devoid of human feelings, killer-coyotes at best, sadistic monsters at 
worst. Bauer himself is injected with a heart-stopping substance to get him to talk 
(Series 2); terrorist Navi Araz shoots his brother without emotion, and is only by 
chance stopped from shooting his own teenage son (Series 4). Those trying to acti-
vate weapons of mass destruction only think in terms of vast casualties, some of 
them gloatingly. We know they are guilty up front, so their moral entitlement not to 
be tortured is narratively zero. 
The foreign wholesale terrorists in many cases are acting out of absolute rage at 
the United States, and cannot be reasoned with. Their ambition is to see American 
streets “flowing with blood” (Series 6), to strike at “financial centers, transportation 
hubs, population centers” (Series 5). In the case of the “insider” terrorists, their 
motivations vary, from fury at having been mistreated as former counter-
intelligence operatives (Saunders, Henderson), to politically highly-placed indi-
viduals (patriots-gone-bad) trying to sway the course of American policy  rather 
than – as they see it – watch the USA be destroyed by wrong-headed policies. Thus 
in Series 6 Deputy Chief of Staff Reed Pollock tries to assassinate his President and 
a repentant terrorist leader, in order to stop both the ex-terrorist from broadcasting 
officially to the U.S. public, and to pin the President’s murder on him. 
Torture. This plays a very major role throughout the series, clearly pivoting 
upon the “Dershowitz dilemma.” It also offers sadistic pleasures to viewers, with 
Bauer multiply tortured, smoke rising from his skin as he screams in pain (Series 
2); with Bauer’s shoulder opened up and assaulted at its neural ganglion by a terror-
ist, and with another counter-terrorism operative assaulted repeatedly with an elec-
tric drill (Series 6). We watch several times a terrorist’s body arc in agony under 
officially sponsored torture (Series 5). We also watch in unhappy or happy ghoulish 
fascination as staff of the counter-terrorism unit choke, their bodies thrash help-
lessly, and they die, through exposure to nerve gas (Series 4). As Sontag (2003: 41) 
observed, “It seems that the appetite for pictures showing bodies in pain is as keen, 
almost, as the desire for ones that show bodies naked.”  
Two of the series’ unequivocal heroes themselves engage in torture for noble 
ends (cf. Andersen 2007: 297-298). Bauer is shown denying pain-medication and 
any medical assistance to a terrorist he has just shot in the shoulder, to try to com-
pel her quickly to talk (Series 2), and in Series 5 shooting a terrorist’s wife in the 
leg and threatening to put a second bullet in her kneecap is to force her husband to 
talk. President Palmer is shown ordering electro-shock to get a member of his own 
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Cabinet to yield information about his co-plotters in planning the threatened deto-
nation of a nuclear device in Los Angeles.  
Central to the narrative of “24” are a series of highly time-sensitive situations, 
almost every one being of supreme urgency, leaving hardly any time to consider 
alternatives, and requiring drastic defensive action. “There’s no time for that!” is a 
frequently repeated line. Perhaps the limit is reached in Series 3 when Bauer ampu-
tates someone’s arm in order to block the spread of a deadly virus to the population 
at large. Each segment of each program starts and closes with a ticking clock, 
showing seconds as well as hours and minutes. The use of two, three and four split 
screens at the beginning and at commercial breaks through each episode, showing 
characters in each of the sub-plots, intensifies the sense of pace and urgency. Cell 
phones are everywhere and enable extreme rapidity of action – the series is an on-
going commercial for the merits of extensive National Security Agency surveil-
lance. Ford SUVs reliably and swiftly - product placement in full gear - switch the 
players from one site to another. In the midst of all the mayhem, however, the worst 
expletive ever heard in the series is “Dammit!”, a remarkable acknowledgment of 
U.S. TV audiences’ sensitivity to cursing as contrasted with the series producers’ 
insensitivity to torture.  
Prime virtues implicitly extolled in these situations are decisiveness, the readi-
ness to opt for the least worst outcome, and the moral courage to swallow one’s 
own moral scruples. Both Jack Bauer and David Palmer exhibit these qualities, 
including the last, whereas by contrast many of those around them have no moral 
scruples to swallow. We are pitch-forked into situation after situation in which we 
have to trust Bauer and Palmer’s essential goodness and moral probity, and indeed 
must hope that their application of torture will do the trick in time. We end up in-
vited to trust authority to deploy pain, though not in the abstract, only via the char-
acters we have come to screen-know rather well and in whom we therefore have 
confidence. The targeted assassinations of Serb terrorists which are the prior back-
drop to much of Series 1 are presented passingly, a bread-and-butter daily matter, 
without any hint that state power was being illegitimately deployed for overseas 
murder (the charge laid against Serbian president Milošević during the Bosnian 
civil war).  
As a logical-ethical proposition, viewers may even find themselves corralled 
into subscribing to the narrative’s ethical priorities. But as always, it is essential to 
stand back and ask ourselves in how many cases, were we permitted to issue an 
opinion in the first place, would the shadowy figures in the world’s counter-
terrorist units be likely to pursue this hierarchy of values rather than others? And 
without seizing upon the innocent, as in Guantánamo, to prove they are hard at 
work solving the case? Particularly with the evidence of what we do know of their 
history around the world, why would we ever trust their values or judgment once 
they have virtually untrammeled power? 
Fully to understand “24’s” narrative, however, requires more than a post-9/11 
perspective. Profoundly enshrined in U.S. historical culture and nationalist imagery 
is the visual trope of encirclement by barbaric enemies, of being lethally imperiled 
(Downing 2007). This frame has been sedimented but also refreshed for at least 
four centuries, and in that sense 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s responses con-
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stitute only the latest chapter in an ongoing imperialist nationalism born of fear, 
born of the manipulation of fear, and born of the experience of suffering retaliation 
for prior violence. There is still more involved at present in terms of the political 
economy of oil and other mineral deposits, in terms of islamicist millenarianism, 





The three nations discussed here have many more nuances and contradictions than 
it has been possible to engage with in this short space. So too in certain respects do 
their discourses and practices of politically-motivated violence. So also have been 
their media representations over time, whether in news or fiction.  
Nonetheless, there are certain key resonances. There is the arrogation of the 
term “terrorist” to cover only non-state political violence, plus its framing as unac-
ceptable and therefore as justifying state repressive violence against non-
combatants. There is the almost universal readiness to use civilian targets as legiti-
mate while simultaneously lamenting that accidents are inevitable. There was in 
Britain and France for long the denial of the state’s torture practices, while in the 
USA they have in recent years been justified by the White House (while jesuitically 
denying they can be described as torture), and legitimated, perhaps for many, via 
“24”. Perhaps “legitimated” may put it too strongly, and it would be more accurate 
to conceptualize the process as both the expansion of the U.S. and global public’s 
threshold of tolerance and our fascination with watching succulent violence. 
Media which challenge these positions, or at least challenge their application to 
the given case, are rather rare. In the USA, The New York Review of Books, in 
France Le Monde Diplomatique, and in Britain The Independent and The Guardian, 
have been the most significant established media organs to operate as if they were 
actually independent of government on these issues. Otherwise, only radical small-
scale media and internet networks have tried to introduce some light into a darken-
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